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Rantau Asia Tenggara merupakan rantau yang dibelenggu oleh bermacam 
jenis konflik dari dulu lagi. Konflik-konflik ini boleh dibahagikan kepada dua 
peringkat iaitu di peringkat antarabangsa dan juga peringkat domestik atau 
dalam negara. Langkah-Iangkah yang digunakan untuk mengurus dan 
menyelesaikan konflik-konflik ini juga tertakluk kepada peringkat konflik-
konflik tersebut, disamping beberapa perkiraan lain yang perlu diambil oleh 
negara-negara yang terlibat, seperti faktor-faktor politik, ekonomi, sosial dan 
keselamatan. Rencana ini memulakan perbincangan dengan memberikan 
gambaran umum ten tang keadaan konflik di rantau ini. Perbincangan 
kemudiannya beralih kepadct huraian teori-teori pemetaan konflik sebagai 
permulaan kepada pembinaan satu kerangka teoritikal bagi membincangkan 
konflik-konflik di rantau ini. Seterusnya, rencana ini membincangkan apakah 
tren dan corak umum konflik dan penyelesaian konflik di rantau info Peranan 
Pertubuhan Negara-negara Asia Tenggara (ASEAN) dalam pengurusan konflik 
yang wujud di rantau ini juga dibincangkdn dalam bahagian terakhir rencana 
ini. Perbincangan tentang kes-kes konflik dan penyelesaian konflik di peringkat 
antarabangsa dan domestik kemudiannya diteruskan dalam rencana-rencana 
lain dalam edisi ini. Kesimpulan yang boleh dibuat daripada rencana ini dan 
juga lain-lain rencana dalam edisi ini ialah bahawa terdapat kaedah-kaedah 
lazim yang biasa digunakan dalam pengurusan dan penyelesaian konflik di 
rantau ini. Walau bagaimanapun, keadaan semasa memerlukan penilaian 
semula kaedah-kaedah ini untuk memastikan keadaan aman dalam ertikata 
yang sebenarnya dapat diwujudkan. 
INTRODUCTION 
Southeast Asia in the year 2001 is a region still beset by domestic conflicts and 
international tensions. This is despite the long experience the Southeast Asian 
countries have had in managing conflicts and maintaining inter-state relations, 
and also despite a period of economic boom in the early to mid 1990s which 
have resulted in relative peace and stability for the region. The period of 
economic crisis, which started in 1997, however, showed how fragile the 
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Southeast Asian economies and political structures can really be. It also 
illuminated the tensions and conflicts both within individual states, which 
ranged from revolutionary movements to armed separatism as well as conflicts 
between states, which continue to irritate inter-state relations. 
Before going into a discussion of conflict and conflict management trends in the 
region, it is illuminating to ponder the question asked by Ruth Me Vey on armed 
separatism in Southeast Asia: 
" ... the question to be posed is not so much of why there is 
armed separatism in Southeast Asia as of why there is not 
more of it. In other words, with such shallow roots, with 
boundaries fixed by colonial rivalries as much as by cultural 
or national barriers, flying in the face of ancient folkways and 
immediate individual interests - what glues the Southeast 
Asian state together?" (McVey, 1984: 3). 
Despite McVey's question of why there is not more conflict, we can be sure 
that this "region of revolt" (Osborne, 1971) is never short of conflicts because 
as an observer pointed out, it "has not passed a single day in at least forty years 
without major insurgent activity" (Jackson, 1985:3). The question is even more 
relevant today especially when combined with problems which arose out of the 
Asian economic crisis. That is why Mc Vey'-s question of what holds the 
Southeast Asian state together is important. This question can equally be asked 
of the other types of conflicts in the region: inter-state and revolutionary 
conflicts. Revolutionary conflicts share a common category with state formation 
conflicts: they are both internal conflicts. Thus, McVey's question directly 
applies to them as well. For inter-state conflicts, however, the focus is slightly 
different. . They are not restricted to the boundaries of a single state, but the 
combined boundaries of all ASEAN countries. Nevertheless, McVey's question 
can also be posed to these countries, with a slight modification: what glues the 
Southeast Asian states together? 
This paper will try to start off the discussion of conflict and conflict 
management in this edition. It surveys some conflicts in ASEAN countries, 
making generalizations of the trends alongthe way. There will be an attempt to 
answer the two questions of what glues the Southeast Asian state together, and 
what glues the Southeast Asian states togethe5.-As will be shown in this paper, 
the strategies of conflict management have been different both between the 
levels (inter and intra) as well as--between countries. What works at the inter-
state level might not work at the intra-state level and vice versa. What is being 
done in one country might also be done· differently in another country with 
varying degrees of success. The key factors are the ways the parties have 
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approached the various types of conflicts, the ways the conflicts have been 
defined, and the conflict management approaches and mechanisms used. The 
other papers in this volume, especially those written by Amer, Ortuoste and 
Thambipillai, will continue this discussion of what holds the Southeast Asian 
states together and how they have managed conflicts between themselves. 
The paper begins by discussing some general ideas on conflict typologies, 
including conflict mapping. This will be used as the basis to analyse conflict 
cases in the region. Some cases will then be highlighted to show general trends 
and patterns. Other papers in this volume will hi&hligqt other specific aspects of 
conflict and conflict managemel}t in the, region. Amer, Ortuoste and 
Thambipillai will look at cases of conflicts between Southeast Asian countries 
and highlight strategies used to deal with these conflicts. All of them will touch 
on conflict management strategies involving the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN). Specifically, Ortuoste focuses on the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARP) and its implications for Southeast Asian security, while 
Thambipillai looks at some culturally-influenced conflict management 
approaches such as the consensus-seeking decision making approach of 
"musyawarah" and "muafakat". Amer looks also at some of the more formal 
ASEAN documents to highlight existing procedures within the organization to 
handle conflict. 
The other papers are divided into two groups. One focuses on the implications 
of extra-regional political situations on the security of Southeast Asia. 
Specifically, the writers have all focused on the impact that China has on the 
region. Swanstrom looks at China's foreign policy outlooks, while Luo Qi 
discusses China-Taiwan relations and how they affect the security of the region. 
Mak focuses on the Spratly islands conflict and discusses how China's political 
calculations will have an impact on the outcome of the conflict. 
The last group of papers looks at intra-regional conflict case studies. Mansor 
focuses on the social conflicts in Malaysia and Indonesia that emerged after the 
Asian economic crisis of 1997 and asks questions on the effect of religion on 
these conflicts. Finally, Teehankee discusses the internal armed conflicts in the 
Philippines. He also discusses the strategies used by the different regimes of 
Marcos, Aquino, Ramos and Estrada in handling the conflicts as well as the 
effectiveness of these strategies. 
3 
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A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
Conflict Mapping 
One of the best way to observe the trends and patterns of conflict situations 
involve mapping them. Before conflict management strategies or techniques can 
be reviewed, we need to know, first of all, about the conflict, its processes, 
dynamics and structure. Questions need to be asked about the frequency of the 
conflicts, how they emerged, who are the parties, what are the issues or 
incompatibilities involved, and how they have been managed or resolved. The 
history and progress of the conflicts need to be charted along with any attempts 
at transforming the conflict situations and their outcomes. This exercise is an 
integral part of analysing conflict situations and is called conflict mapping. 
Wehr argues that "the macroscopic view of conflict emerging from (a) review 
of transdisciplinary theory is essential for students of conflict, but it is not very 
helpful for analysing specific conflict situation. For that one needs a map as a 
framework for analysis" (Wehr, 1979: 18). Wehr goes into great detail about 
this and mentions that conflict mapping should include information such as 
conflict description, history, context, issues, dynamics, alternative routes to 
solutions, and conflict regulation potentials. I 
Wehr's method of conflict mapping is also evident in the work of other analysts 
involved in the study of conflict and conflict management, with modifications, 
of course, depending on the scope and concentration of each particular 
analytical strategy. For example, in his illustration of case studies involving 81 
conflicts, Miall describes and examines conflicts in terms of their areas; parties; 
I 1. Summary Description; II. Conflict History; III. Conflict Context; IV. 
Conflict Parties. (A) Primary; (B) Secondary; (C) Interested Parties; V. 
Issues. (A) Facts-based; (B) Values-based; (C) Interests-based; (D) Non-
realistic. 
VI. Dynamics. (A) Precipitating events; (B) Issue mergence, transformation, 
proliferation; (C) Polarization; (D) Spiralling; (E) Stereotyping and mirror-
imaging. 
VII. Alternative Routes to Solution(s) of the Problem(s). 
VIII. Conflict Regulation Potential. (A) Internal limiting factors; (B) External 
limiting factors; (C) Interested or neutral third parties; (D) Techniques of 
conflict management. 
For a detailed explanation of Wehr's conflict mapping guide, please refer to 
Wehr, (1979: Chapter 1). 
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third parties; issues; (use or non-use ot) coercion; hostilities; fatalities; and, 
resolution. He then gives a descriptive account of each conflict's background, 
and development, and, where applicable, resolution, outcome, and factors 
affecting the settlement of each conflict (Miall, 1992: Part 5). 
Similarly, Peter Wallensteen and his Uppsala team have made a comprehensive 
list of armed conflicts and major trouble spots around the world, based on their 
own definitions and understanding of contlict (Wallensteen, 1988; Wallensteen, 
1999; Wallensteen and Axell, 1994: 333-349; Walcnsteen and Sollenberg, 
1995: 345-360). Armed conflict is defined by the Uppsala t~am as "armed 
contested incompatibilities which concern government and/or territory, where 
the use of armed force by two parties of which at least one is the government of 
a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths" (Wallensteen'l 1994: 333). 
This definition is further broken into two categories, which are called "minor" 
and "major" armed conflicts, based on the number of battle-related deaths.2 
However, this type of typology of armed conflicts has its limitations, i.e. its 
inapplicability due to the number of battle related deaths required to classify 
any conflict. In the case of conflicts in Southeast Asia it is sometimes more 
useful to use general definitions which do not restrict the classifications in such 
a way. For example, in their discussion of the proposal for a framework of 
analysis for armed separatism in Southeast Asia, Paribatra and Samudavanija 
defined armed separatism as, 
"a process whereby an ethnic group, seeks to secede or gain 
autonomy from the control, de facto and dejure, of a given 
state, through an organized and purposeful use of force, alone 
or in combination with other means. Such use of force 
constitutes acts of revolutionary violence in that it expresses a 
rejection of the prevailing political system and a 
determination to bring about 'progressive' changes by 
overthrowing this system" (Paribatra and Samudavanija, 
1984: 32). 
According to Wallensteen, minor armed conflicts are those where the battle-
related deaths during the course of the conflict are below 1000; major armed 
conflicts can be divided into two: intermediate conflicts, where there are more 
than 1000 battle-related deaths recorded during the course of the conflict, and 
where 25 but less than 1000 deaths have occured during a particular year; 
and, wars, where there are more than 1000 battle-related deaths during one 
particular year. For further information, please see Wallensteen, (1994, 1995). 
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Such general description of a conflict situation is much better suited for a study 
of this kind, which involves looking at conflicts at different tiers or levels. 
Types of Conflict: an Overview 
To effectively analyze the roles, involvement, and effectiveness of ASEAN 
countries in managing conflicts within the region, certain limitations need to be 
made as to the types of conflict included in this study. The methodological 
framework for this classification will be roughly based on a combination of 
Miall's and Wallensteen's overview of conflicts. An overview of what is called 
the "international social conflicts" (ISC) will also be done in this section to 
highlight the difficulties involved in classifying conflicts into particular 
categories. 
Wallensteen broadly grouped conflicts into 3 categories: 
1. Classic wars: i.e. conflicts involving two governments using their military 
forces against one another; 
2. Wars of state formation: i.e. conflicts involving one government and an 
opposition group demanding autonomy or secession for a particular ethnic 
group or region; 
3. Internal wars: i.e. conflicts over the control of government within a given 
state, the existence of which is not questioned, and where the issues 
involved may concern changes within the existing politico-economic 
framework or changes of the system as such (Waleensteen, 1989: 6). 
The explanation for these three definitions of con11ict is quite straight forward. 
These 3 conflicts can also be divided into an inter-state conflict (1), and intra-
state conflicts (2 and 3). Wallensteen, however, notes that conflict (2), state-
formation conflicts, is in fact an "in-betwf'en category", notably because "they 
involve the changes of internal institution, when expressed as demands for 
autonomy, but affect the international community, when expressed as demands 
for independence or change of statehood" (Wallensteen, 1989: 6). This 
uncertainty regarding certain types of intra-state conflict was echoed by Miall 
who says that, "a strict distinction between internal and international conflict is 
difficult to maintain, since much conflict starts within states and then spills over 
their borders, while international conflict often exacerbates domestic conflicts" 
(Miall, 1992: 114). Rarnsbotham and Woodhouse call this phenomenon an 
"international-social conflict" (ISC), which they define as "neither purely inter-
state conflict (such as the Iran-Iraq war), nor confined within the normal 
institutionalised rules and procedures of domestic conflict management (such as 
the aftermath of the Los Angeles riots)r but sprawls somewhere between the 
two" (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1996: 87). These ISCs can have 
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similarities in objectives and characteristics with inter-state conflicts (i.e. 
territQrial acquisition), and internal/revolutionary conflicts (i.e. religious or 
political programmes imposed upon the government). The distinguishing factor 
is that they are fundamentally about "enduring identity groups which are 
organised to insist on the satisfaction of their needs, interests, and beliefs which 
do challenge the integrity of the state" (Lewer, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 
1995;: 18). This type of conflict has been given numerous other terms in the past 
such as "internal conflict", or, "civil war", but these terms do not capture the 
further "twin characteristics of ISCs: (a) that they are rooted in relations 
between communal groups within state borders (the 'social' component, and (b) 
that they have broken out of the domestic arena and become a crisis for the state 
itself, thus automatically involving the wider society of states (the 'international' 
component)" (Lewer, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1995: 25). According to 
Lewer et aI, there are four gradations within the ISCs: 
(i) countries where there are incompatibilities between 
identity groups but where levels of conflict are minor (less 
than 1,000 deaths since inception) and humanitarian concern 
(denials of rights + refugee flows) compared with severe 
cases of ISC is low (potential ISC); 
(ii) countries where incompatibilities between identity groups 
are putting pressure on the state system, where conflicts are 
moderate (25-1,000 in one year) and humanitarian concern is 
rising but which have not yet destroyed or broken through the 
state system (threshold ISCs); 
(iii) Conflicts which have fractured the state system and rage 
unresolved (severe ISCs); 
(iv) conflicts which have a history of ISC at level (ii) above 
but which are lessening in severity and subject to peace 
agreement or cease-fires (dormant ISCs) (Lewer, 
Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse, 1995: 18). 
A fifth category, which is called latent ISCs, is also evident. This type of 
conflict includes those conflicts where communal identity forms the basis of 
discontent with state policy and development, but where frustrations have not 
become intense enough to challenge state stability. 
There are four structural features which are conducive to the outbreak of 
international-social conflicts: 
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(i) Social heterogeneity and the discrepancy between existing state 
borders and the distribution of peoples and cultures. Lewer et al 
argues that ISC is more likely to arise in culturally heterogeneous 
than in culturally homogeneous states. 
(ii) The political crisis of the contemporary state. It is suggested that ISC 
is more likely to arise in politically weak and unintegrated states, 
particularly 'quasi-states" than in strong states with developed 
representative institutions. 
(iii) Underdevelopment and asymmetries of wealth and power. Here, ISC 
is more likely to arise in societies which suffer from economic 
underdevelopment, or where resources are perceived to be unevenly 
distributed, than in developed states capable of delivering some 
measure of distributional justice. 
(iv) The influence of cross-border politics. The generalisation made here 
is that ISC is more likely to arise where external relations across 
borders or with other states exacerbate the situation than where they 
do not (Lewer, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1995: 29-33) 
The phenomenon of ISCs, as explained by Lewer, Ramsbotham and 
Woodhouse, quite efficiently cover the essence of conflicts between communal 
groups and their possible implications for not only the state, but also the 
international community. Examples are the various communal conflicts in 
Indonesia such as in Ambon and Kalimantan. However, many of the conflicts in 
the ASEAN countries have also involved the government as an active party to 
the conflict, either as an extension of a communal group involved in the 
conflict, or as the government being directly challenged by an opposing group 
(which in many cases is representing a particular type of people based on 
ethnicity, religious, language, culture, or all of them). When this happens, the 
position of the ISCs is not quite so clear. This is perhaps what Ramsbotham 
and Woodhouse meant by the "grey areas". In some cases, however, the 
government can and does represent a particular communal group. For example, 
the conflict in Southern Thailand between the Pattani Muslims and the Thai 
government (seen as representing Thai-Buddhist interests). Another example is 
the conflict between the Moro-Muslims of the Southern PhilippInes islands 
against the government of the Philippines which is seen as representing 
Filipino-Christians interests. Although they have both involved the government 
as a party, conflicts like the two mentioned above, along with conflicts which 
have been resolved such as in the former East Timor between the Indonesian 
government and the Timorese people can be classified as examples of ISCs in 
ASEAN countries. This is because they fulfilled both requirements of the ISCs, 
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namely that it has to happen between two communal groups and that it has 
broken out of the domestic arena. The latter characteristic may not be as clear 
cut as the first one, but all three cases have involved sympathetic third parties 
helping out the non-government sides: elements from Malaysia and other 
Muslim countries have at one time or another helped the Pattani people in 
Southern Thailand and the Moros in the Philippines, and Portugal and 
international (especially, Catholic Christian and human rights interest groups) 
protests have raised the Timorese case at the international level. 
Definitions and scope 
This section will describe and define some of the working definitions used in 
this discussion. By conflict, we will mean: a situation where a minimum of two 
parties have incompatible views on a political issue(s), based on differing 
interests and perspectives, and pursuing the matter via either informal or formal 
action(s). 
The parties to the conflict may include the parties mentioned below: 
1. A sovereign government (i.e. any ASEAN country - Malaysia, Indonesia 
etc.). 
2. Any organization or group which has a grievancelinterestlcause against the 
government (i.e. PKM, PULO etc.), or another organization or group and 
seeking to rectify the situation or pursue it's interests. 
Types of conflict: 
1. Inter-state: a conflict based on a political incompatibility between two or 
more countries over an issue(s), or action(s), or both. 
2. State formation: a conflict which involves a government and a group 
demanding autonomy or forms of secession from the existing state. 
3. Revolutionary: a conflict which involves a revolutionary group as one of 
the parties and can either be within the established system (i.e. military 
coup), or concerning demands for revolutionary changes (i.e. democracy, 
socialist, or religious state). 
4. Socio-political: a conflict which arises out of social and political changes 
and developments within a particular country. It can be over deep-rooted 
differences that have surfaced because of policy changes or certain crises in 
a particular country or even within the region. _ 
5. International Social Conflicts (ISCs): a situation where an internal 
conflict has gained prominence at the international level and has invited 
outside interests to participate in the conflict. 
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These conflicts can be roughly grouped into two types of conflict: 
(1) inter-state, and (2) intra-state (state fonnation, revolutionary and socio-
political types of conflict). An intra-state conflict can also be called an ISC 
depending on the involvement of outside parties in the conflict. Analyses and 
comparisons can be made of the different strategies of conflict management to 
tackle these conflicts. A second comparison can also be made of the strategies 
to manage the various intra-state conflicts. Each conflict can be labelled using 
one or more of the typologies given above. There are bound to be cases where a 
particular conflict will include two or more categories because of overlapping 
interests, parties or conflict dynamics. 
CONFLICTS INVOLVING ASEAN COUNTRIES 
Conflicts within the ASEAN countries over the last forty years can be put into 
the categories described above. Many of these conflicts, especially those 
involving secessionist and insurgency movements, were generally not products 
of the cold war. They were in fact products of the earlier period of colonialism 
and the process of decolonialization. They have, however, remained as 
problems that still need to be resolved even after so many years. Then there are 
conflicts that emerged or resurfaced after the economic crisis of 1997. Also, 
although inter-state conflicts in the region are unlikely to evolve into full-scale 
conflicts, they remain as sources of tension, suspicion and misunderstanding. 
Examples of some of the ongoing conflicts involving ASEAN countries, 
divided into inter-state and intra-state conflicts, include the following: 
III 
Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan and China. _ 
4. Dispute between Malaysia and Singapore over Pulau Batu Putih (Pedra 
Blanca), an island about 55 km east of Singapore in the Straits of Johor. 
5. Boundary dispute between Indonesia and Vietnam on their demarcation 
line on the continental shelf in the South China Sea, near Natuna Island. 
6. Boundary dispute between Indonesia and the Philippines in the Celebes 
Sea. 
7. Border disputes between Malaysia and B~nei over the unmarked, 247 km 
land border between Brunei and Malaysia, as well as the limits of their 
respective 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone. 
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8. Dispute between Malaysia and Indonesia over the islands of Sipadan, 
Sebatik and Ligitan in the Celebes Sea, about 35 Ian from the city of 
Semporna in Sabah. 
Intra-state: 
1. Armed communist insurgencies in the Philippines. 
2. Moro-Muslim separatist movement in Southern Philippines. 
3. Pattani-Muslim separatist movement in the Southern Thailand provinces of 
Narathiwat, Pattani, Yala and Songkhla. 
4. The Acheh separatist movement in northern Sumatra, Indonesia. 
5. Spillover from the independence of East Timor. 
6. Separatist movement in West Papua, . Indonesia, led by the Free Papua 
Organisation. 
7. Communal conflicts in various parts of Indonesia including in Jakarta, 
Kalimantan, and Ambon. 
TRENDS AND PATTERNS OF CONFLICTS 
Inter-state conflicts 
The conflicts in the lists above can be surveyed according to their parties, issues 
involved, background, conflict management (CM) methods used, and their 
outcomes. From there, we can make some generalizations about the trends and 
patterns of the conflicts. Firstly, many of the issues in contention in the inter-
state and state formation conflicts can be traced back to the colonial period and 
the uncertainties caused by independence. Many inter-state conflicts have as 
their root causes contested territories and interests between the states involved. 
Also, because of the territorial nature of the conflicts, they are all very difficult 
to resolve, coming up from time to time to affect relations between the 
conflicting parties. At the same time, there were also tensions which have 
resulted from differences in opinions about the policies of neighbouring 
countries. 
One example of an inter-state conflict that was resolved outright was the 
confrontation or "konfrontasi,,3 between Malaysia and Indonesia which 
"Konfrontasi" (Malaysia-Indon,esia confrontation) (1963-1966): 
Background: When President Sukarno of Indonesia heard that Malaysia was 
going to be formed incorporating peninsular Malaya, Singapore,' and the 
states of Sabah and Sarawak in Borneo, he said that the move was an 
extension of western imperialism engineered by the British and the Malaysian 
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happened in the period between 1963 and 1966. Agreements were reached in 
1966 to end the war and friendly ties between the parties were resumed shortly 
after that. It can even be said that the formation of ASEAN in 1967 was a 
continuation of the process of reconciliation between the two countries. The 
general feeling at that time was that a regional organization with a multitude of 
common goals and objectives would bring the warring countries as well as other 
regional neighbours closer together. 
Another example of a conflict that can be considered as resolved was the 
"officer hanging incident,,4 which happened in 1968 involving Singapore and 
Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman. He claimed the whole area to be part 
of Indonesia Raya (Greater Indonesia). He embarked on a campaign to 
disrupt the fragile new state of Malaysia by sending his troops to Borneo and 
the western part of the Malay peninsula, and by conducting a huge 
propaganda campaign against Malaysia. He was . unsuccessful because 
Malaysia had the backing of troops from Britain, Australia, and New Zealand. 
At home his popularity declined and he was finally toppled by a military coup 
in 1965 led by General Suharto who was to become the president of 
Indonesia until today. 
Conflict management: A state of war existed between Malaysia and 
Indonesia between 1963 and 1965. The war break down after Sukarno lost 
power in the abortive GEST APU coup in 1965 and the rise of Suharto who 
immediately repudiated the aggressive policies of his predecessor. Indonesia 
also went on to repair ties with Malaysia and together with other Southeast 
Asian countries formed ASEAN in 1967. Outcome: Resolved. 
4 Officer hanging incident (1968): 
Background: Two Indonesian officers were sentenced to death by the 
Singaporean government on charges of espionage during the "konfrontasi". 
This incident caused a public uproar in Indonesia and there were calls for the 
Indonesian government to act against Singapore. President Suharto asked for 
leniency by Singapore but his request was turned down. No further actions 
were taken after that although relations between the two countries were 
strained. 
Conflict management: Restraint by Indonesia in the name of ASEAN unity. 
This was among the first test of the ASEAN conflict management process. 
Although public pressure was very strong asking for Indonesia to intervene, 
good sense prevailed in the end. Singapore, on the other hand, has always felt 
vulnerable as the smallest state in ASEAN and especially for being 
surrounded by "Malay" states. It, however, states that it has to uphold the 
decision to maintain its integrity as a sovereign state. This line of action is 
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Indonesia. Although no formal actions were taken to lower the tension between 
Singapore and Indonesia, the conflict lapsed after a while and eventually 
forgotten. In fact this "non-action", especially on the part of Indonesia, 
contributed greatly to the reducing of the tension and the normalization of 
relations. Another case which was not formally ended but was forgotten after a 
while was the "Contemplacion affair,,5 of 1995 involving Singapore and the 
Philippines. Despite diplomatic relations being severed for a short period; the 
conflict lapsed after a while and relations were resumed with both parties 
agreeing to put the incident behind them. 
evident in Singapore's foreign policy making throughout the· first period of 
the "formative stage" (Askandar, 1994). Outcome: Lapsed (resolved) 
5 The Flor Contemplacion Affair (1995): 
Background: A Filipino citizen, Flor Contemplacion, who w~s working as a 
maid in Singapore was found guilty by the Singaporean court for the murder 
of a fellow Filipino maid. Contemplacion denied the charges but was found 
guilty and sentenced to death by hanging. There was a huge uproar in the 
Philippines over this sentence and there was a call by the Filipino government 
through President Ramos requesting for a stay of execution and the re-
investigation of the case because of the belief that Contemplacion might have 
been wrongly convicted. These requests were denied and the sentence was 
carried out. Relations between the two countries worsen and resulted in the 
withdrawal of both ambassadors. Throughout this period, however, the two 
countries maintained their dialogue not only over the case but also over a 
whole range of bilateral and multilateral cooperation. A Filipino diplomat 
said that she felt that during this time diplomatic relations between the two 
countries have actually increased in its intensity (Askandar, 1996: Appendix 
3). She said that they have never felt closer to the Singaporean leadership 
than during this time. There was no question at all that ASEAN unity was 
going to be affected by this case. She said that the Philippines government 
was under tremendous pressure at home to do something about the case, and 
that was why the ambassador was recalled and formal diplomatic relations 
suspended. It was also to the credit of the other ASEAN countries that they 
did not take sides in the conflict and refrain from making public comments 
regarding the issue which could have an effect on the conflict. A Malaysian 
diplomat said that other ASEAN countries rallied behind the two countries 
and tried to pacify the situation by way of informal talks and discussions 
(Askandar, 1996: Appendix 2). In the end, the tension cooled off and 
diplomatic relations was restored. 
Conflict management: Restraint by both parties, along with informal talks 
between them. "Informal mediation" by other ASEAN countries to pacify the 
situation. Outcome: Lapsed/Resolved. 
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It is also interesting to note that the only conflict over territory that has been 
fully resolved was the one before ASEAN was created (the Malaysian-
Indonesian "konfrontasi"). The other conflicts have all persisted despite moves 
by the parties involved to rectify the problems. It needs to be said, however, that 
these conflicts have been reduced in their severity and do not posed as big a risk 
to bilateral relations as they once did. There have also been initiatives to settle 
some of the conflicts. For example, Indonesia has taken the initiative to bring 
together parties to the Spratly islands6 conflict in a "Workshop on Managing 
Conflicts in the South China Sea". No solutions have yet to be found for this 
issue, although the parties have agreed to try find a peaceful solutions to the 
problem. On the other hand, Malaysia and Singapore have agreed to send their 
dispute over Pulau Batu Putih7 for arbitration to the International Court of 
Justice. Although this signals their intentions of finding a peaceful solution to 
the dispute as outlined by the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast 
Asia, it also underlines their unwillingness to use existing procedures of conflict 
settlement such as thoseprovided under the Treaty of Amity. 8 
State-formation conflicts 
All the state formation conflicts have also involved territories and the perceived 
artificial national boundaries. This has led to attempts by secessionist 
organizations to secede from the state and create new states based on their 
communal identities. To summarize the many variables involved in their 
identification as separate communal identities, we can say that these conflicts 
6 Please refer to Mak's paper in this volume. 
Pulau Batu Putih (Pedra Blanca): 
Background: Pulau Batu Putih or the island of Pedra Blanca is a small island 
situated between Malaysia and Singapore in the Strait of Johore. Its only 
importance is a lighthouse situated on the island. Both parties, however, claim 
that it has strategic importance because of its location. This conflict has never 
threaten relations between the two countries and is only contested because of 
principles. More recently, the success of the Growth Triangle incorporating 
the state of Johore in Malaysia, the island of Batam in Indonesia, and 
Singapore has positively affected relations between the two countries and the 
conflict has consistently decreased in importance. 
Conflict management: This conflict has been dealt with bilaterally between 
the two countries. More recently, this conflict has been sent to the 
International Court of Justice (lCJ) at the Hague for arbitration. No decision 
has been made yet. Outcome: Not resolved. 
8 Please refer to Amer's paper in this volume. 
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are over "socio-political" issues, which include communal identity, language, 
religion, cultural, economic, and political survival of a particular group. All the 
organizations advocating independence in the ASEAN countries have stressed 
these points, although they may differ in terms of the main issue in focus, i.e. 
religion, economic, or political. Most of the time however, a combination of 
these issues have been cited as the reasons behind secessionist activities. 
Ultimately, they all see the creation of a separate sovereign state as the only 
solution to their problems. To achieve this goal, they have all been involved in 
armed uprising against the central government with varying degrees of 
successes. Most of the cases have been dealt with using a combination of 
aggressive government suppression and more peaceful programmes including 
negotiations and appeasement policies.9 
There are also more cases of state formation conflicts in Indonesia than in any 
other ASEAN countries. 10 This can be attributed to the fact that Indonesia is the 
biggest country with the largest number of people, many of whom belong to 
separate ethnic, language, and religious groups. Many of these groups have 
been unhappy under centralized Indonesian rule because of the perceived 
injustices done to them. All secessionist activities in Indonesia, with the 
exception of the one in former East Timor, have however proved unsuccessful 
because of swift and severe actions taken by the Indonesian authorities. 
Revolutionary Conflicts 
Revolutionary type conflicts differ from the other two because their main 
objective is not power over a particular territory, but over the whole country. 
Their main goal is to create a revolution, wrest control of the government, and 
ultimately create a new government. Many of the revolutionary movements 
surveyed are ideology-based groups, either pro-communist, pro-democracy, or 
pro-religious. Cases in the region of pro-communist insurgencies are numerous 
in countries like Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia. All of 
them, however, have died down with the possible exception of the Philippines 
where the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing the 
New People's Army (NPA) are still surviving. I I 
See Teehankee's paper in this volume on the policies toward armed 
separatism in the Philippines. 
10 Examples are in the former East Timor, Acheh, Riau, and West Papua (Irian 
Jaya). 
II New People's Army (NPA) (1969-) 
Parties: The Philippines government vs the New People's Army (NP A) 
(Bagong Hukbong Bayan) 
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Background: The NP A is the armed wing of the Communist Party of the 
Philippines (CPP). The CPP itself was a splinter group of the old Partido 
Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) and its military wing, the Hukbong 
Magpapalaya ng Bayan (HMB or Huks). The CPP was established in 
December 1968 by young, middle class intellectual cadres who broke away 
from the PKP because of generational and ideological differences. The 
CPP /NP A has grown over the years and has managed to attract large 
numbers of followers as a response to the repressive and inegalitarian 
policies of the Marcos government. By 1985, it has an estimated 10,000 to 
12,000 regulars which expanded to 25,000 in 1987 and supported by 
(according to it) 6 million Filipinos in 60 provinces. The reason behind the 
CPP/NPA's continuing attraction has to be the endless poverty and perceived 
social injustices as well as military misbehaviours in the countryside, in 
direct contrast to communist ideology'S promise of equality of access to 
material goods and a more just social order. The failure of the government to 
provide for the economic well being of the people at that time has left no 
alternative for an increasing number of Filipinos but to join the NP A or, at 
the very least, give it their sympathetic support. It comes as no surprise then 
that the eastern rim of the Philippine archipelago, areas where traditionally 
government neglect has been the rule rather than the exception, and where 
large scale poverty can be found, have been a success with the NP A 
recruiters. At the same time, because of rampant corruption among 
government personnel including the police, soldier and paramilitary 
personnel, the people of the countryside who were victimised have no other 
recourse within the system. They then become easy targets for the NP A's 
propaganda, and the NP A in tum are perceived as the people's protectors 
against harassment and abuses by government agents. The Filipino 
government has tried to counter the popularity of the NP A by passing 
policies aimed at gaining the support of the poor, such as the land reform 
programme started in 1972. It also adopted other measures to meet the 
problem of insurgency, such as the TANGLA W (Tanod at Gabay ng Lahi at 
Watawat) programme to provide the appropriate motivational orientation to 
soldiers, OPLAN KA TATANGAN (Operation Plan Stability) to improve 
the military and socio-economic aspects of counter insurgency, as well as 
various military reforms after 1983. However, these policies have proved 
insufficient to counter the communist challenge which seems to have grown 
more serious. 
Conflict management: Military solutions such as the T ANGLA W 
programme which involved reforms in the military, i.e. discipline and 
motivation; Civic Action, which saw the military providing services ranging 
from medical care to infrastructure construction and family assistance. The 
16 
Kajian Malaysia. Jld. XV/fl. Nos. /&2. 2000 
Pro-democracy revolutions have been more prevalent in recent years with 
success stories from the Philippines and Indonesia, with Marcos being replaced 
by Aquino and then Estrada replaced by Arroyo in the Philippines, and Suharto 
toppled after 32 years in power in Indonesia. These revolutions were successful 
because of popular support from the majority of the masses representing all 
aspects of their societies. 
Lastly, pro-religious revolutions have been unsuccessful in the region because 
of the multi-ethnic and multi-religious nature of many of the countries. 
Examples are the Islamic movements in Indonesia in the 1950's and 1960's 
where the Darul Islam and the BPRRI have as their goal the take-over of the 
government, and in Darul Islam's case, an Islamic revolution and the creation of 
a new Islamic state. 12 However, these Islamic-based revolutionary movements 
aim here was to initiate projects to improve the people in the community; 
OPLAN KATATANGAN, which was the same as Civic Action with the 
goal of winning the hearts of the people and weaning them away from the 
insurgency groups such las the CPPINPA. The plan involved the 
development of a people-oriented military and the adoption of a combination 
of security and development operations with the cooperation of the relevant 
government ministries and agencies. The plan also recognized the 
relationship between security and stability on the one hand and economic 
development and well being on the other. Lastly, OPLAN MAMA Y AN 
(Operation Plan Citizen) was launched after the February Revolution. This 
was seen as a comprehensive approach to the insurgency problem, 
incorporating public safety, military, social, psychological, economic and 
political measures as its constituent elements. It seeks to involve the 
military, civilian officials, and private sectors in a co-ordinated effort to 
fight the insurgents. Its three priority areas are security, development and 
national reconciliation. It also included the concept of "territorial defence 
system" in which the people organize themselves against harassment and 
intimidation by the insurgents with military assistance. Finally, the plan also 
included a regionalisation of troops in that soldiers were assigned to their 
ethno-linguistic regions. This was designed to enhance the effectiveness of 
the soldiers by putting him in a familiar environment where he not only 
knows the country but also speaks the local language. Outcome: Not 
resolved. 
12 Revolutionary-type armed rebellions in Indonesia have mainly occurred in 
the past. They included (1) the Madiun communist rebellion (1948), (2) the 
Darul Islam (1948-1962), and (3) the PKI (1965). Indonesia has had both 
communist-type armed rebellions as well as religious armed rebellions. All 
revolutionary armed rebellions in Indonesia have suffered from severe 
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were successfully put down by the Indonesian authorities. An Islamic 
reformation of sort is also taking place in Malaysia where the Islamic based 
political party PAS is making headways in Malaysian politics by capturing two 
states and reducing votes for the incumbent regime in the last general election 
in 1999. 
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT TRENDS AND PATTERNS 
Some of the factors behind the general failure of state formation and 
revolutionary movements to achieve their goals III the region can be 
summarised as follow: 
Suppression by the authorities. This has been the most used strategy to 
counter intra-state conflicts in ASEAN countries. In all the cases surveyed, 
responses by the governments to these conflicts, and especially the state 
formation organizations, have been both swift and severe. Wherever possible, 
the secessionist movements were not allowed to gain momentum and support 
from the public. Arrests, especially of the leaders, were made to stop the 
movements from the top and the various militaries were deployed to suppress 
the armed uprisings. Of all the ASEAN countries, Indonesia has been 
particularly severe in its use of the military as can be seen from the examples of 
East Timor and Acheh, and to a lesser degree, West Papua. The Philippines' 
response to state formation organization has been more varied. Although 
military might was used against the Moros in Mindanao, there have also been 
other strategies like the negotiations with the Moros in Libya and the co-
optation of Moro leaders into government positions. Responses to revolutionary 
type movements in all ASEAN countries have been more varied. Military 
suppression against the revolutionary groups was still the main method used, 
but other more subtle counter insurgency methods like the amnesty 
military actions from the Indonesian authorities. The highlights of 
communist activities in Indonesia have been in the 1950s and early 1960s 
during the Sukarno era when the PKI (Parti Komunis Indonesia) enjoyed the 
status of being Sukarno's adviser and confidante. However, miscalculations 
over the readiness of their masses of supporters for a communist revolution 
led to the failure of their coup attempt in the Gestapu Affair of 1965. 
Government reprisals after the coup attempt completely annihilated the PKI 
structure. Pockets of resistance still exist in Kalimantan and East Java until 
1968 but were effectively attacked by the authorities until they no longer 
were able to function as a meaningful insurgency group and were forced to 
give up their struggles. 
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prograrrunes, the use of the intelligence, and rural development projects were 
also fully utilised. 
Inter-government cooperation. The ASEAN countries have also benefited 
from close bilateral cooperations with each other regarding the issues of 
security. Many of the ASEAN countries have bilateral agreements with each 
other like the Malaysia-Thailand border agreements, the agreement on the fight 
against piracy in the Sulu Sea between Malaysia and the Philippines, as well as 
various military exercises conducted between Malaysia and Singapore, and 
Malaysia and Indonesia. Cooperation in security issues and especially against 
insurgencies between ASEAN countries stemmed from the beliefs of their 
leaders that insecurity and the instability that usually follows it is a contagious 
thing and can spread from one country to another. This belief started from the 
days when many of the ASEAN countries were fighting the threat of communist 
insurgencies in their respective countries and was carried on even when this 
threat has abated. ASEAN countries have also "supported" each other when 
faced with state formation conflicts by way of "non-involvement" in domestic 
conflicts of neighbours despite whatever inter-state problems that might exist 
between themselves. These "non-interference" and "non-intervention" policies 
are part of an important factor of the "ASEAN way of consensus". It was thus 
that when Indonesia invaded East Timor in 1975 and received a lot of 
international protests over this action, other ASE;AN countries have rallied 
behind Indonesia by saying that Indonesia had to do it for reasons of national 
security. Only Singapore was late in its support ~ of Indonesia but this was 
because of Singapore's perceived vulnerable position as the only Chinese 
dominated state in the middle of the Malay-Muslim world of Southeast Asia. In 
the end this did not deter Singapore from also. supporting Indonesia. Another 
example of the non-involvement of ASEAN countries in state formation 
conflicts in their neighbouring countries is the case of conflict in Southern 
Thailand. 13 Although there were elements in Malaysia which sympathised with 
13 Southern Thailand 
Parties: Thailand government vs (1) Pattani United Liberation Organization 
(PULO) (1967-); (2) Barisan National Pembebasan Pattani (BNPP) or 
Pattani National Liberation Movement (1971-); (3) Barisan Revolusi 
National (BRN) or the National Revolution Front (1960-late 1960s). 
Background: The main issue of this conflict is the secession and 
independence of the Pattani, Yala, and the Narathiwat provinces in Southern 
Thailand. These three provinces have their own unique history apart from 
the general Thai one going back when they were part of the ancient Malay 
kingdom of Langkasuka, to the more recent one of rebelling against the Thai 
kingdom in the early parts of the 20th century. The latter one resulted in the 
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PULO and the Pattani people over the plight of the Malay-Muslims in Southern 
Thailand, the official stance of the Malaysian government has been one of non-
involvement in what it regards as Thailand's own domestic problem. In fact, 
there have even been cooperations between Malaysia and Thailand such as 
in the breaking up of the Pattani province and the beginning of their forced 
integration into the provincial administration of the Thai kingdom. 
Gradually, local administrators were replaced by Thais resulting in the 
exclusion of the Muslim-Malay elites from political participation. This is the 
reason behind the Pattani movement according an analyst. It was argued that 
the nature and impetus of the historical conflict between the central Thai 
Government and the Muslim-Malays in Southern Thailand are political, and 
not religio-cultural as some scholars seem to imply (Askandar, 1996: 
Chapter 3). It was also added that this conflict is not different from the 
conflicts between the central government and other minority or power 
groups in the country, although a combination of other factors such as 
religious, linguistic, socio-cultural, and economic, have contributed to the 
exacerbation of the conflict. Neither the Thai government nor the political 
system has ever been totally accepted by the Pattani people, especially by 
their elites .. However, judging from the importance of religion and culture 
and the emphasis placed on them by all the Pattani liberation movements, 
we must not underestimate their roles in the mobilization of the Pattani 
people. 
However, the unsparing use of force by the Thai military in dealing with 
political opposition in the region has helped dampen their spirits and put the 
separatists in disarray. Finally, there is a growing feeling among the Malay-
Muslim groups that their situation is now irreversible and that they should 
face the reality of being a province in South Thailand. This more than 
anything else has led to the downfall of Malay-Muslim separatist 
movements in Southern Thailand. 
Conflict management: Suppression by the Thai authorities; ban on the 
movements; the arrests of movement leaders. The plight of the Malay-
Muslim people in southern Thailand has been a major thorn in inter-state 
relations between Malaysia and Thailand. Thailand has often accused Malay 
nationalist groups especially near the Malaysia-Thai border of supporting 
the Malay-Muslim people of southern Thailand. Thailand has also accused 
the Malaysian government of turning a blind eye to these clandestine 
supports. Although relations between the two countries have been strained 
by this case especially in the 1970s, it has never really been serious enough 
to hamper cooperation in other areas, including the ones within ASEAN. 
Outcome: Not resolved, but very much reduced in intensity 
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military exercises along the Thai-Malaysia border targeted both towards the 
various Malay-Muslim organizations as well as the Communist Party of Malaya 
(CPM) 14 which operated in the same areas. Because of all the evidences from 
the trends in conflict and conflict management within the ASEAN countries, it 
can be concluded that there is a huge difference between the treatment of inter-
state and intra-state conflicts within ASEAN. A major factor of the ASEAN 
14 Communist Party of Malaya (CPMl (1946-1990) 
Parties: Malaysian government vs the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) 
Also Malaysian government vs the North Kalimantan Communist party. 
Background: The CPM conducted guerrilla warfare soon after the end of the 
Second World War, first against British colonial rule and then against the 
Malayan/Malaysian government. They operated from the jungles in the 
Malaysian-Thailand border. Sir Henry Gurney, the High Commissioner 
killed in an ambush in October 1951, and Sir Gerald Templer, who 
succeeded him, believed that the "Emergency" (1948-1960) was a battle for 
the "hearts and minds of the people." During the Emergency period, several 
strategies were used to coerce and induce the revolutionaries to surrender 
and give up their armed struggle. Apart from the obvious military 
maneuvers which was aimed at flushing them out of the jungles, other more 
subtle methods based on the findings of the intelligence, or the special 
branch, were also used. For example, the resettlement programmes into the 
"new villages", under the Briggs Plan, deprived the guerrillas of food and 
other support. Amnesty was also offered under ·terms that gave them the 
courage to surrender and to convince their former comrades into doing the 
same. None of these measures, however, were quick-fix solutions, and it 
took twelve years, from June 1948 till July 1960, before the Emergency was 
finally called off. The CPM continued its struggle from the jungle until its 
leadership decided to lay down their weapons and end their armed struggle 
in 1990. Since then, the numbers of their already depleted cadres have been 
reduced even more, amidst declarations of victory from the Malaysian 
government. 
Conflict management: Emergency 1948-1960; counter-insurgency 
strategies such as the setting up of "new villages", amnesty programmes, the 
use of the arm forces and especially the army, and infiltration by members of 
the special branch. An interesting aspect of counter-insurgency activities has 
been the many bilateral military cooperation between neighbouring ASEAN 
countries i.e. Malaysia-Thai, Malaysia-Indonesia. This is because 
communist threat is seen by the leaders of these countries as contagious and 
can spread from one country to another. Thus, by helping their neighbour in 
countering the communist threat, they are also preventing the spread of 
communism in their own countries. Outcome: Resolved 
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conflict management process is the non-interference and non-involvement of 
one country in the domestic. affairs of fellow ASEAN members. This was 
evident throughout all the cases studied. 
Economic development. Perhaps a more effective and long lasting conflict 
management strategy to counter intra-state insurgencies has been economic 
development by individual ASEAN countries. As observed by Samudavanija 
and Paribatra, 
"Economic development is seen to be essential not only for 
the regime's process of legitimation, but also for the nation-
state's overall security, as evident from the concepts of 
'national resilience' and 'comprehensive security' espoused by 
the members of ASEAN. One assumption seems to be that 
economic development, by enlarging and consolidating a 
state's administrative, financial, industrial, technological and 
military resources, increases the efficacy of the various 
instruments of national power and thus helps to enhance its 
security. Another seems to be that economic development, by 
raising people's welfare and standard of living, serves to 
lessen and ameliorate conflicts within society arising from 
class, racial, ethniC, regional and doctrinal differences. In 
other words, prosperity is the key to both the regime's and the 
nation-state's security." (Samudavanija and Paribatra, 1987: 
4-5). 
The rate of economic development in all ASEAN countries has been 
tremendous over the last thirty years, until the economic crisis which started in 
1997. It has come to a point now that Singapore can be called an industrialized 
country with the others, especially Malaysia and Thailand, following closely 
behind. With economic development and prosperity in the ASEAN countries, 
and with the corresponding increase in the standard of living of the people, 
there have been less issues especially for revolutionary groups to raise. An 
example of how this has contributed to the demise of a revolutionary group is 
the CPM's case in Malaysia. Socialists and communists groups in general have 
had difficulties in propagandizing their socialist ideals to a community who 
benefits from the economic success of the country, and who prefers the stability 
of preserving the status quo to the instability that might come about by 
supporting revolutionary movements. In countries where economic 
development and success have been more limited like the Philippines, one can 
see the trend of acceptance and support of revolutionary movements like the 
NP A among the masses. In certain areas, the people have in fact preferred rule 
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by the NP A who have provided security and stability in contrast to the corrupt 
and ineffective local Philippines authorities. 
The conclusion that was made by ASEAN leaders in the 1960's and 1970's was 
that for the whole region to be rid of revolutionary movements, there must be 
economic success in all ASEAN countries. It was the Indonesian government 
that proposes in 1967 the idea of "national resilience" of individual ASEAN 
countries contributing to the "regional resilience". "National resilience" in the 
Indonesian sense can be achieved through national developments in all areas, 
and especially the economy. Also according to the Indonesian view, it has a 
reciprocating effect with stability and security. One way of increasing economic 
cooperations and linkages between the ASEAN countries is the setting up of 
"growth triangles" areas. At the moment. the growth triangle of southern 
Malaysia - Batam Island (Indonesia) - Singapore has proved successful for the 
three participating areas. Other existing growth triangles are the growth triangle 
of north-west Malaysia, southern Thailand, and northern Sumatra (Indonesia), 
as well as the one between Malaysian and Indonesian parts of the Borneo island 
and the island of Mindanao in the Philippines. 
Another evident that shows that ASEAN countries value economic cooperation 
and success as a conflict defusing strategy can be seen from its active push for 
the liberalization of trade in the ASEAN region. After the 1992 Summit 
meeting in Singapore, the leaders of ASEAN agreed to set the stage for closer 
economic relations with the proposed ASEAN Free Trade Area with a 15 year 
period to reach this target (later decreased to 10 years). 15 The importance of 
these developments is the fact that none of these inter-state economic projects 
can be achieved without the internal economic development of individual 
ASEAN countries. 
However, the Asian economic crisis which hit the region from 1997 resulted in 
the suspension of many development projects in the region. Countries like 
Thailand, Indonesia, and to a lesser extent Malaysia and the Philippines, were 
badly hit. As expected, with economic crisis comes political upheavals and 
political instability resulting in revolutionary movements of the pro-democracy 
type. 
Rural development. Closely related to national development and economic 
success for the whole country is rural development. All ASEAN governments 
have targeted rural development as a major strategy against both state formation 
and revolutionary conflicts. Most of the grievances related to these two conflicts 
15 See the Singapore Declaration of 1992. 
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have been taken up by groups opposed to the central governments and feeding 
back their ideals to the affected people who mostly lived in the rural areas or the 
outer islands. To tackle these groups the ASEAN governments have to embark 
on their own rural development programmes to improve the standard of living 
of the people in the rural areas with the hope that they won't be too easily 
swayed by rebellious movements, either state formation or revolutionary. A 
survey of rural policies sees a general similarity between the ASEAN countries, 
with a slight difference depending on the administration. The Philippines for 
example have embarked on various programmes in Mindanao and Luzon to 
appease the Moros and the NP A respectively. They have also restructured the 
roles of the military in the rural areas so that the people can have a more 
favourable view of them. This was also done in Thailand. Rural developments 
in lVlalaysia were aimed among other things at decreasing the support for the 
CPM. Among the projects was the setting up of "new villages" away from areas 
vulnerable to attacks and influence by the CPM. Rural development and 
resettlement are also used in Indonesia with varying degree of success. In 
Acheh this was used to sway the Achehnese from the GAM. In West Papua, 
rural developments have included the building of roads into previously 
inaccessible areas and the opening up of new areas for agriculture under the 
transmigration or "transmigrasi" (TM) projects. Lastly, Indonesia also tried to 
bring the people of West Papua and the former East Timor closer into the 
general Indonesia community under their national integration programmes. 
Two Thai analysts comment that, in dealing with domestic conflicts, ASEAN 
countries have generally 
" ... attempted to forge workable 'syntheses' between 
bureaucratic activism (or the 'thesis') on the one hand and 
pluralism generated by socio-economic changes (or the 'anti-
thesis') on the other. These syntheses take the form of 
'participatory authoritarianism' or 'guided participation' which 
is intended to provide the framework of security for social 
and economic development" (Samudavanija and Paribatra, 
1987: 15). 
Up until the turbulent period of 1997 to 1999, two broad types can be seen 
within ASEAN. The first one can be seen in countries like Malaysia and 
Singapore which have established democratic institutions and a tradition of 
civilian control over the military. Here, the process of synthesizing involves: 
"a) the preservation of the democratic institutions and 
practices; b) the developments and maint~nance of one 
predominant political party which controls the instruments of 
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power of the state and the system of patronage; c) the co-
optation of the younger, well educated generations, the 
technocratic and the minority groups into the structure of the 
one-party system; and d) very strong emphasis on the 
ideology of development as a means of broadening mass 
support" (Samudavanija and Paribatra, 1987: 15). 
This can be compared with Thailand and Indonesia, two ASEAN countries 
which used to be dominated by the military. Here the process is a two-tiered 
one involving: 
"a) the institutionalization (or at least attempts at 
institutionalization) of the predominant role of the military in 
the processes of political, social and economic development, 
and b) the creation of "orthodox" democratic institutions, the 
parameters of whose role, progress and behaviour are 
determined by the military with its power of coercion and 
patronage" (Samudavanija and Paribatra, 1987: 16). 
The domestic stability and economic success of Malaysia and Singapore bears 
testimony to the success of the latter type of synthesis compared with the more 
turbulent developments in Thailand and Indonesia. Indonesia, until the 
revolution of 1998, has fared better than Thailand in setting up its own brand of 
"participatory authoritarianism". Since after the Gestapu affair of 1965, the 
military'S role in Indonesia was legitimated by the "dwi-fungsi" or dual-function 
doctrine which requires it to undertake not only the task of national defence but 
also a "positive socio-political role" at all levels of the Indonesian society. This 
led to the control of all political processes from the presidency right down to the 
grass root level by the military during Suharto's presidency. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has shown that the ASEAN region is still rife with conflicts, both of 
the inter-state as well as the intra-state nature. Despite the many efforts spent on 
managing these conflicts, as well as trying to resolve them, there are still 
numerous conflicts going on within and between the ASEAN countries. One 
analyst commented that situations have worsened since the end of the Cold 
War. 
"One of the more unfortunate consequences of the end of the 
Cold War is the likely increase in regional conflict. Not only 
has the salience of regional conflict been enhanced in relative 
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terms by the disappearance of the East-West conflict, but the 
end of that conflict has 'removed the tempering mechanism' 
that often served to keep regional tensions under control" 
(Ball, 1994: 160). 
Many of the post-cold war security concerns that have emerged have arised 
from the uncertainties brought forward by the extraordinary rate and extent of 
change which now permeates the region. The situation is made worse by the 
decline of superpowers' role and influence in the area and the transition from a 
situation of bipolarity to one leaning more towards some form of multipolarity. 
A few observations from the trend of conflicts in the post-cold war era suggest 
that first of all, inter-state conflicts make up about two-third of conflicts in the 
region, with land border being the major issue in contention in many conflicts. 
Secondly, since the security environment of the area is essentially maritime, 
another popular issue for inter-state conflicts are maritime boundaries and 
offshore territorial claims. Lastly, it has also been suggested that because of the 
high proportion of inter-state issues, there is a greater chance of inter-state 
conflicts in the Asia Pacific region then elsewhere (Ball, 1994: 163). All these 
point out the need for the institutionalization of conflict management 
mechanisms within not only the ASEAN region but also the wider Asia Pacific 
region. 
Situations have also worsened after the economic crisis which hit the region 
starting in 1997. This crisis resulted in political upheavals of varying degrees in 
all countries of the region. Conflict situations in Southeast Asia, especially 
those which can be categorised as domestic or intra-state conflicts, are now 
more numerous than at any other time of Southeast Asian history. 
What can be said about ASEAN's contribution as an organization to the 
management of these conflicts? As two different levels of conflict were 
discussed in this paper, ASEAN's contribution must also be looked at through 
these two different levels. ASEAN has contributed to the management of inter-
state conflicts by prescribing a framework for conflict management through it's 
multilateral Treaties and the decision-making process of "musyawarah".16 It has 
called for the peaceful settlement of disputes between member countries in its 
Treaties and documents. 17 Secondly, ASEAN has also contributed to the 
management of inter-state conflicts through p.roviding a platform for 
16 Please refer to Thambipillai's paper in this volume. 
17 Please see the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, 1976, as 
well as the Declaration of the ASEAN Concord, 1976 for examples of 
provisions regarding this issue. 
26 
Kajian Malaysia, lid. XVI/I, Nos. 1&2,2000 
consultation and negotiation not only of conflict issues but also all other issues. 
This has resulted in the prevention of conflict, as conflict issues that might 
affect relations between ASEAN member countries will be filtered out via the 
rigorous consultation and negotiation prior to decision-making. For ongoing 
conflicts, although ASEAN does provide a formal management strategy in its 
treaties, they have not been used. The members have preferred to resort to 
negotiating directly between each other or using ASEAN meetings as the place 
for consultation, albeit informally. 
For intra-state conflicts, the role of ASEAN is clear. It does not, as a regional 
organization, involve itself in the management of these conflicts, no matter 
what the nature of these conflicts are, revolutionary or state formation. 
ASEAN's contribution to the management of this ~ype of conflict is providing 
the members with a formal place to make declarations that support each other 
when faced with domestic troubles and which are binding upon all its members. 
For example, one of the most sacred princip~e of ASEAN is the non-
intervention and non-interference of outsiders in dpmestic politics of individual 
member countries. This prohibition does not refer! only to countries outside the 
region or outside ASEAN but also to the ASEAN ¢ountries as well. All ASEAN 
countries have been allowed to manage conflicts. within their own borders in 
their own chosen ways. As such, we see a variety of ways in which these 
conflicts have been managed by individual countries, from setting up civic 
programmes to outright suppression using military force. Another way ASEAN 
has influenced intra-state conflicts is by reassuring member governments that 
despite all the domestic problems that they may facing at any time, they do not 
have to worry about problems arising out of their relations with other ASEAN 
countries. This in tum has made them able to concentrate on problems within 
their own border without worrying about problems from outside, or even 
outside help for the insurgents or revolutionaries. 
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